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The Demand for Environmental Quality in 





The purpose of this paper is to understand the long run demand for energy-related environmental quality, 
its influence on legislation and on transitions to low polluting energy sources. It starts by presenting a 
simple  framework  of  the  relationship  between  the  demand  for  and  supply  of  environmental  quality, 
environmental legislation and energy. This forms the structure for presenting a series of episodes in 
British history where a demand for improvements in energy-related environmental quality existed. This 
analysis proposes that markets can drive transitions to low polluting energy sources, in specific economic 
conditions. However, most probably, governments will need to push them, and this cannot be expected 
without  strong  and  sustained  demand  for  environmental  improvements.  Yet,  while  demand  is  a 
prerequisite, it is not enough. It must also be spearheaded by strong, creative and sustained pressure 
groups  (i.e.,  powerful  lobbying  and  the  weakening  of  the  counter-lobby)  to  introduce  legislation,  to 
enforce it and to avoid it being over-turned by future governments.  
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A transition to a low carbon economy is seen as a possible solution to meeting the demand for climate 
stability  (Grubb  et  al.  2008,  Foxon  et  al.  2008).  Given  society  and  policy-makers‟  interest  in 
transitions from the existing fossil fuel-dominated energy system, it might be valuable to identify how 
past energy transitions have evolved. These may offer insights that are relevant for how to or how not 
to aid a desired transition. 
While a number of studies have investigated historical energy transitions (Schurr and Netschert 1960, 
Cipolla 1962, Humphrey and Stanislaw 1979, Fouquet and Pearson 1998, Grübler 2004, Gales et al. 
2007, Bartoletto and Rubio 2008, Kunnas and Myllyntaus 2009), offering a rich understanding of 
their  nature  and  implications,  fewer  have  explored  the  drivers  of  these  transitions.  Smil  (2010) 
emphasized the key role new technologies played in generating past energy transitions. Grübler et al 
(1999)  identified  that  technological  innovations  depend  on  achieving  economies  of  scale  in 
production. Geels (2002) showed how the co-evolution of technologies, industries and institutions 
enabled new energy sources to emerge. Madureira (2008) highlighted the role played by resource 
endowments and government objectives. Allen (2012) stressed the importance of prices in driving 
energy transitions.  
The conclusion from a review of fourteen past experiences was that any future transition seems likely 
to occur only if the new combination of energy sources and technologies provides cheaper services 
(Fouquet 2010). In addition, a transition to a low carbon economy might require a qualitative change 
in the energy sources. In a number of past cases, the substitution enabled qualitative changes in the 
nature of the service provided, and niches of consumers were willing to pay more for the associated 
additional value. However, the additional value was associated with private benefits.  
Most of the benefits of a consumer buying low carbon energy sources will be passed on to society as a 
whole, rather than generating large private gains. So, voluntary efforts to reduce emissions by using 
low polluting (i.e. higher value) but more expensive energy sources are likely to be hampered by the 
tendency for many consumers to free-ride.  
Nevertheless, society and individuals appear to value reductions in carbon dioxide emissions and a 
transition to low carbon energy sources (Brouwer et al 2008, Lee and Cameron 2008, Mackerron et al 
2009, Löschel 2010, Diedrich and Goeschl 2011). Given this demand for climate stability and a social 
benefit from a transition to low carbon energy sources, yet a tendency to free-ride, it is important to 
improve our understanding of how this demand might be met and such a transition might be achieved.  
The purpose of this paper is to focus-in on past experiences to identify the factors that enabled the 
demand for environmental quality to become environmental legislation, and the factors that led a 3 
 
transition  to  a  low  polluting  energy  source  to  become  a  key  part  of  the  legislation  to  meet  this 
demand.  To  do  so,  it  presents  a  simple  framework  for  understanding  how  this  demand  for 
environmental  quality  might  have  been  met,  which  fits-in  with  Carson´s  (2010)  proposal  for  a 
structural model of the factors determining environmental quality. It then reviews five episodes from 
British history of the demand for energy-related environmental quality and whether it could be or was 
met by low polluting energy sources.  
The  next  section  presents  the  conceptual  framework  outlining  the  demand  for  and  supply  of 
environmental quality and the cause of the market failure that implies that supply does not respond. 
This leads to a discussion about the process through which government can influence the supply to 
meet demand, such as encouraging the use of low polluting energy sources. It then identifies some 
reasons why government fails to act as a conduit between supply and demand. The third section 
reviews five historical cases where the energy-related environmental improvements were demanded. 
Section four discusses some insights from these experiences for a possible transition to a low carbon 
economy. The final section draws conclusions.  
 
2. Environmental “Markets” and Legislation   
2.1. The Demand for and Supply of Environmental Quality  
One way to understand energy transitions to low polluting energy sources are by focussing on the role 
of changing dynamics of the demand for and the supply of environmental quality on energy markets 
(Pearson 1994, McConnell 1997, Kolstad 2006). Throughout history, and as will be discussed later, 
energy consumption has been responsible for a great deal of health and environmental damage. Some, 
observing  these  external  costs  and  recording  their  scale,  have  demanded  improvements  in 
environmental quality (Brimblecombe 1987).  
At  a  particular  level  of  pollution,  the  higher  are  the  marginal  external  costs  or  equivalently  the 
marginal benefits of abatement, the more we might expect individuals to be willing to pay (or seeking 
other means, such as lobbying for legislation) for improvements in environmental quality. Plotting the 
marginal external costs associated with energy-related pollution or its equivalent as marginal benefits 
of  abatement  at  different  levels  of  pollution  identifies  the  Demand  curve  for  improvements  in 
environmental  quality  (see  Figure  1).  The  demand  curve  might  be  flat,  implying  the  pollution 
generates the same damage and benefits of abatement at all levels of pollution. Alternatively, the 
demand curve might be downward-sloping, as in Figure 1, indicating that as pollution levels increase 
(i.e.,  a  reduction  in  environmental  quality),  the  marginal  damage  and  benefits  of  abatement  also 
increase.   4 
 
Through time, factors might change the related demand for this environmental quality. In Figure 1, 
these changing factors are reflected by a shift in the demand curve. It is important to appreciate that 
although, the marginal benefits of abatement might change, for, say, demographic or physical reasons, 
one might expect the impact of a pollutant on an individual´s health to remain the same through time. 
















Figure 1. The Demand for and Supply of Environmental Quality 
First, as income rises, households have more time and money to be concerned about the environment 
– that is, there is a „positive‟ income elasticity for the environment. Second, although there is limited 
evidence  of  this,  as  income  rises,  households  may  be  more  concerned  and  interested  in  the 
environment – a „greater than one‟ income elasticity for the environment (Dorfman 1977). In fact, 
there is evidence that in certain cases, income elasticities for environmental quality are relatively low 
(Kristrom and Riera 1996, McConnell 1997). However, it does appear that when an economy is in a 
recession, environmental concerns decline, as economic and other social issues take priority. Thus, in 
the short run, demand might be quite unstable, shifting with the business cycle.  
Third,  possibly  helping  to  justify  the  existence  of  higher  income  elasticities  is  the  fact  that 
communities  with  higher  incomes  tend  to  have  a  greater  awareness,  information,  education  and 5 
 
knowledge of environmental pollution, risks and hazards. This often drives the introduction of more 
stringent environmental legislation (Dasgupta et al 2002, Kahn 2002). Brasington and Hite (2005) 
examined the relationship between the price of housing and environmental quality, and found that 
price elasticity is relatively small, and propose that this result indicates either that people are not very 
sensitive to changes in the price of environmental quality or they cannot easily respond to changes in 
environmental quality, as it depends on public decisions or moving. Thus, fourth, more open and 
democratic political systems should be more willing to reflect the concerns and sufferings of the 
public (López and Mitra 2000). 
The supply curve reflects the marginal costs of abatement. Generally, these costs of abatement are 
expected to rise as pollution declines, suggesting that when polluters reduce emissions, they seek the 
cheapest options first. Just like demand, through time, the “supply” of environmental quality may shift 
- as in Figure 1, from Supply to Supply‟. The existence of a demand for and supply of environmental 
quality  (or  at  least,  for  improvements  in  environmental  quality  (McConnell  1997))  suggests  the 
potential for a social optimal level, identified in Figure 1 by the meeting, at Q*1, of the demand 
(Demand‟) and supply (Supply‟) curves.   
The factors shifting the supply may worsen or improve the level of pollutant emissions and the ability 
of waste receptors to deal with these emissions. First, economic development has been associated with 
a  shift  from  agriculture  to  heavy,  then  light  industry,  and  finally  services.  Each  of these sectors 
required  different  energy  services,  different  energy  sources  and  imposes  different  environmental 
damages (Mosley 2010). Second, as more „cleaner‟ technology is produced and used, unit costs may 
fall.  If  increasing  returns to  scale  do  exist,  wealthier  countries,  because  of  greater investment  in 
pollution  abatement,  can  reduce  emissions  more  cheaply  (Andreoni  and  Levinson  2001).  It  also 
suggests that, at the same stage of economic development, current developing economies might also 
have access to cheaper abatement technologies than today‟s developed economies. Third, polluters 
(whether individual agents, cities or countries) can export their emissions, either to uninhabited or 
poorer areas and countries; this is a broader version of the „pollution haven‟ hypothesis (Cole 2004).  
Finally,  transitions  in  energy  sources  used  (e.g.  from  biomass  to coal  to  petroleum  to  gas)  have 
frequently,  and  often  coincidently,  had  a  lower  or  higher  impact  on  the  environment.  At  times, 
however, this transition may not have been coincidental and may have depended on the influence of 
demand for environmental quality. This demand might generate a demand for energy sources causing 
little pollution. This links the “markets” for environmental quality and energy, and is central to this 
paper. In Figure 1, substitution to low polluting energy sources might be seen as an additional shift in 
the supply curve, from Supply‟ to Supply‟‟.  
Certain minor incentives encourage polluters to reduce the external costs of their pollution. First, a 
consumer´s use of energy is likely to be somewhat inefficient. Better resource management reduces 6 
 
costs and pollution at the same time. But, these incentives only imply that they will reduce pollution 
as long the costs (of abatement) are negative (i.e., the private benefits outweigh the costs). Second, a 
consumer may be image-conscious. An individual may concerned about his/her social status, and 
using “inferior” or the “wrong” equipment, technology or energy source may be an undesirable signal 
to send. Similarly, a company may realise that its product differentiation and ability to sell its product 
is in part dependent on the image it portrays in relation to environmental care and how shareholders, 
employees, contractors and consumers perceive it (Blacconiere and Patten 1994). In Figure 1, the 
incentives are represented by a short dashed arrow (along the Supply‟ curve), and the outcome is a 
slightly higher level of environmental quality. While this conspicuous consumption may drive certain 
(niche) consumers to reduce emissions, it cannot be expected to generate much abatement, without 
additional incentives, such as prices or punishment.   
In  general,  since  the  costs  of  pollution  are  incurred  by  society  (as  damage  to  health,  natural 
ecosystems, etc..), the energy consumer has tended to ignore these external costs when deciding how 
much to consume. The consequence is that the demand for and supply of energy (or other goods) 
generating negative externalities has tended to be too high. From an environmental perspective, a 
socially insufficient level of environment quality is provided – in Figure 1, perhaps a little more than 
Q1 but certainly much less than Q*1 (Buchanan 1968). 
2.2. The Supply of Environmental Legislation 
It has been suggested that, since the external costs associated with energy consumption are not fully 
taken into account, the market for environmental quality fails to develop properly. The inability to 
directly signal preferences to the supply side creates a demand for environmental legislation, which 
can in turn influence supply. The combination of legislation and the threat of enforcement might 
create incentives for externality-generating agents to internalise them, and improve the supply of 
environmental quality, towards the optimal level where demand and supply meet.  
The supply of environmental legislation can be considered a many-step process – the first two steps 
are the proposal and the vote. First, government makes a proposal about the appropriate level and the 
institutional framework (i.e., instrument choice) to ensure supply side adjustments to the demand for 
environmental quality. Then, in parliament, a vote is made to decide whether the proposal should be 
accepted  or  rejected,  possibly  subject  to  amendments.  Both  the  proposal  and  the  vote  can  be 
considered  the  outcome  of  the  interaction  of  the  demand  (from  the  public  and  various  pressure 
groups) for and the supply (by policy-makers and politicians) of environmental legislation (Keohane 
et al. 1998). In a democratic political system, if a proposal is made and sufficient politicians vote in 
favour of the proposal (often in two votes, in the lower house (e.g., Commons or Representatives) and 
the Upper House (e.g., Lords or Senate), then the legislation can be introduced.  7 
 
Once the legislative framework is set-up, there is a need for monitoring and enforcement. This may 
often  be  provided  by  a  regulatory  body  (e.g.  most  recently,  an  environment  agency).  Often  this 
authority may have other roles, in addition to this one and, therefore, determines the amount of effort 
that  it  will  provide  to  monitoring  and  enforcing.  This  will  depend  on  resources  available  (e.g., 
members of staff and equipment for the tasks), the pressures to provide the service, and other similar 
costs and benefits as the politician, including ideological beliefs and lobbying. 
If the authority does monitor and enforce, it ensures that the constraints imposed on economic agents 
are binding. As a consequence, the supply of environmental quality adjusts, hopefully, towards the 
equilibrium with the demand (in Figure 1, this is represented by another dashed arrow or a shift in the 
supply curve, to Supply‟‟). The stronger is the monitoring and enforcement, the more likely the policy 
is going to actually influence the supply of environmental quality; without sufficient threat, supply 
cannot  be  expected  to  meet  the  demand.  In  many  cases,  major  polluters  will  not  necessarily  be 
included in the legislation and, therefore, pollution is improved only a little towards its optimal level.  
Finally, even if legislation has been introduced, enforced, monitored and captured all the relevant 
polluters, a future government may seek to overturn the legislation. Again, this over-turning will need 
to follow a similar process, although, this time, it would receive the backing and lobbying from 
groups that have experienced financial losses from the original legislation. Especially, in times of 
economic  crisis,  many  may  consider  the  financial  and  economic  benefits  (over  overturning  the 
legislation) to outweigh the health and social benefits. Thus, to keep the environmental legislation 
requires a strong and sustained demand for environmental quality and for legislation.   
2.3. Government Failures in Environmental Legislation 
While  the  public  may  value  improvements  in  environmental  quality  and  be  putting  considerable 
pressure on politicians, there exist many factors that may lead to „government failure‟, such that the 
market for environmental quality remains either not regulated or sub-optimally regulated.  
First, as mentioned above, pressures on politicians may sway decisions away from the ideal plan. 
Politicians within government are pursuing their own objectives (Breton 1974). The government acts 
as  a  temporary  monopoly  supplier,  enabling  politicians  within  to  use  this  position  of  power  to 
combine public goods, such as the regulation of environmental pollution, with private goods that may, 
for example, assist in achieving their personal objectives. For example, decisions may be guided by an 
attempt to win votes, possibly from a strategic minority (Buchanan and Vanberg 1988, Boyer and 
Laffont 1999) or to appease powerful lobbies with stakes in the outcome of policy choice (Fernandez 
and Rodrik 1991, Dijkstra 1999) or even to avoid bad press associated with policies that might harm 
the low-income groups more than proportionally.  So, while the government decides what its outputs 
will be and in what quantities, it is open to influence about these decisions. Many different pressure 8 
 
groups are likely to want to influence the decision-making process, including company managers, 
shareholders and employees from  many  different industries (either  as  consumers  or  producers  of 
energy), trade unions and environmental organisations, etc... Their influence on the likelihood of 
legislation and the type of instruments used will depend on the power of each pressure group, the 
coalitions formed amongst them and the methods of influencing. One can expect that, at a given level 
of pollution, the higher the marginal benefits of abatement (e.g., Demand‟ at Q1 (i.e., roughly the 
current level of pollution) in Figure 1), then the greater will be the lobbying for legislation, and the 
higher  the  marginal  costs  of  abatement  (e.g.,  Supply‟  at  Q*1  (i.e.,  the  possible  target  for 
environmental legislation)), then the more intense will be the counter-lobbying against legislation.  
Second,  the  costs  and  complexity  of  producing,  distributing  and  assessing  scientific  or  other 
information  can  hinder  regulators‟  ability  to  identify  the  optimal  level  of  environmental  quality. 
Environmental pollution and the attempt to minimise its consequences raise great uncertainties, which 
can be reduced through information collection and analysis. Since resources are limited, a trade-off 
between expenditure on information and on action must be  made.  Insufficient funds allocated to 
information will mean an excessive level of uncertainty remains, hindering the potential for action. 
Excessive  expenditure  for  information  will  leave  implementation  underfunded  or  delayed.  Also, 
misallocation  of  resources  between  these  two  activities  will  reduce  overall  policy  effectiveness 
(Brunner and Klein 1999). Furthermore, as scientific information passes from the need to reduce 
uncertainty about a problem, into the market for scientific analysis with opaque methods of allocating 
resources and the incentives of researchers, and then into the world of media, it is unlikely that 
valuable, non-controversial knowledge will have been generated and used through the most efficient 
allocation of funds (Stevens 1996). Nevertheless, new scientific understanding and its media coverage 
can radically alter public perception of the pollution, potentially shifting the demand to the right in 
Figure 1. Similarly, new technological developments can reduce the marginal costs of abatement, 
shifting the supply curve to the right.   
Third, bureaucracy may also limit the socially optimal decision-making of government. Although 
government makes the decisions, most of the funds are channelled through civil servants hands, who 
have their own objectives (Niskanen 1971). Each department or bureau receives funds reflecting a 
perception  of  its  output  -  the  society‟s  benefits  increase  with  the  department‟s  output,  but  at  a 
decreasing rate. It incurs costs, which like assumptions about other organisations tend to increase 
more than proportionally as output increases. Ideally, the government should increase fund provision 
to  the  department  until  the  marginal  benefits  equal  the  marginal  costs.  In  this  market  for  the 
administration and implementation of regulation, the outcome will be the result of interaction between 
supply (e.g., the Ministry of Health or Environment) and demand, that is, the government (Breton and 
Wintrobe 1975). Because of government‟s inability to correctly estimate this level and one of the 
bureaucrat‟s key objectives being to maximise budget size, the government will tend to over-fund 9 
 
departments,  reducing  the  efficiency  of  policies.  Furthermore,  either  because  internalisation  is 
considered of secondary priority, departments may clash over objectives (Oates and Strassman 1978) 
or the personality of civil servants driving policies are weak (in comparison with those responsible for 
other policies), funds and activities are inefficiently allocated. Finally, the high costs and complexity 
of implementation, monitoring and enforcement may also hinder progress towards legislation.  
 
3. Historical Demand for Environmental Quality and Legislation 
This section reviews five episodes in British history (the seventeenth century (3.1), the Victorian era 
(3.2-3.4), and the early- (3.5), mid- (3.7-3.8) and late-twentieth century (3.9)) where a demand for air 
pollution  improvements  existed,  in  order  to  identify  the  demand´s  influence  on  the  supply  of 
environmental legislation and on transitions to low polluting energy sources. 
3.1. Fumifugium in the Seventeenth Century  
In the seventeenth century, coal consumption in London had been growing rapidly (see Figure 2). The 
transition from woodfuel to coal had begun in London in the sixteenth century as chimneys and grates 
were being introduced and refined, a reliable coal trade from  the North-East of England developed, 
and the difference between the local price of coal and woodfuel increased (Allen 2012, Fouquet 
2011a). The growing population and expanding economy of London created a rising demand for 
heating fuels, increasingly met by the coal trade.   
This  increase  in  coal  combustion  led  to  a  growing  air  pollution  problem  in  London,  which  was 
highlighted by a number of gentlemen associated with the Royal Society (Brimblecombe 1987). Most 
famously, John Evelyn, in his pamphlet Fumifugium, argued that the smoke associated with coal 
burning, particularly related to industry, was harmful to the population. Indeed, he points-out that, 
during the English Civil War (1642-46), the coal trade was severely disrupted, coal prices soared, and 
London  air  quality  improved  greatly  (Evelyn  1661  p.21).  He  proposed  that  London  should  be 
redesigned, forcing polluting industries (such as brewers, dyers and lime-burners) to be based at 
sufficient distance from the population (Jenner 1995). Also, efforts should be made to ensure a cheap 
supply of woodfuel to households to reduce air pollution (Brimblecombe 1987 p.49). 
Coal  producers,  merchants  and  consumers  of  the  time  were  a  heterogeneous  group  with  little 
coordination. Also, scientific understanding was in its infancy and John Evelyn was a member of the 
Royal Society, the bastion of natural philosophy and the height of scientific enquiry of the time. He 
was able to meet with King Charles II to discuss the problem. Thus, building on previous scholars 
studies, he required relatively little proof to convince his colleagues and the King of the problem of 
air pollution. In January 1662, “the Queen´s Attorney sent Evelyn the draft “of an Act, against the 10 
 
nuisance of the Smoke of Lond, to be reformed by removing severall Trades, which are the cause of 
it, and indanger the health of the K: and his people, etc. Which was to have ben offerd to Parliament, 










Figure 2. Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom, 1500-2000 
However, there is no evidence the Act was passed. Furthermore, following the Great Fire of London 
in  1666,  and  the rebuilding  of  London,  there  was  little  effort  to  reorganise the  city  in-line  with 
Evelyn´s  objectives  or  the  proposed  Act  (Birmblecombe  1987  p.52).  If  it  was  introduced,  the 
legislation  probably  would  have  failed  to  dissuade  consumers  given  the  advantages  of  coal  over 
woodfuel in the capital. Inevitably, proposals to reduce pollution, as well as use more benign energy 
sources, were unsuccessful.  
3.2. The Demand for Air Quality in Victorian Britain  
Later, in the mid-nineteenth century, after a further two hundred years of growth in coal consumption, 
air pollution in London was becoming far worse. The problem was immortalised in the stories of 
Sherlock  Holmes.  The  Adventure  of  the  Bruce-Partington  Plans  began  “In  the  third  week  of 
November, in the year of 1895, a dense fog settled down upon London. From Monday to Thursday I 
doubt whether it was ever possible from our windows in Baker Street to see the loom of the opposite 
houses.” (Doyle 2003 p.412). When the fog descended, trains stopped running, court cases were 11 
 
abandoned, thieves prowled. The fog was coal smoke, which became trapped on windless days in the 
winter, when homes needed extensive heating, and the fog shielded the warmth from the sun. In the 
late nineteenth century, London averaged 80 days of dense fog per year! In parts of the city, such as 
West Norwood, in 1885, more than 180 days were recorded as foggy (Clay and Troesken 2010 p.62). 
The  economic  costs  to  London,  and  other  major  cities,  grinding  to  a  halt  due  to  the  fog  are 
unimaginable.  
The rise in smoke concentration has also been linked with the rapidly soaring mortality rate attributed 
to bronchitis - from 25 deaths 100,000 inhabitants in 1840 to nearly 300 in 1890 (see Figure 3). A 
conservative estimate of the annual health damage caused by coal production and consumption at the 
end of the nineteenth century was £(2000)20 billion and close to 20% of the British GDP (Fouquet 
2011b).  
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Figure 3. Air Pollution Concentration in London, and Mortality Rate attributed to Bronchitis in 
London and England & Wales (1800-2000) 
Despite the rapid rise, many dissenters, possibly encouraged by industrialists fearing environmental 
legislation, questioned the harmfulness of air pollution. The miasma theory proposed that natural and 
biological decay caused impurities in the air, and smoke actually cleansed the air of these impurities. 12 
 
This only started to be formally rejected in the 1880s, and a consensus formed about the health 
damage caused by smoke (Thorsheim 2006 p.195).  
From the 1860s, the Smoke Abatement Societies in the major urban centres in Britain spearheaded the 
demand  for  improvements  in air  quality. These  voluntary  organisations  were  off-shoots  of  wider 
movements seeking to improve environmental conditions and concerned about public health, bringing 
together women, middle-class professionals and non-conformist Protestants, partly driven by a belief 
that the lower classes needed to be cared for and their behaviour controlled (Thorsheim 2006 p.80). 
The highly concentrated pollution in Manchester led to the creation of the first Smoke Abatement 
Society. “During the 1870s and 1880s it sponsored public lectures, classes, and publications that were 
intended to educate the public about the benefits of clean air and to promote gas cooking and heating 
appliances in place of coal fires.” (Thorsheim 2006 p.81).    
The  Smoke  Abatement  Societies  across  Britain  tried  to  pressure  succeeding  governments  into 
introducing legislation. They gained strength in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century, 
when the damage done by air pollution was at its worst (see Figure 4), and their pressure mounted.   
Coal 
Expenditure  Total External Costs 
Source: Fouquet (2011b)    
Figure 4. Estimates of the Total External Costs of Coal Production and Consumption, compared 
with Expenditure on Coal, 1700-2000 
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As early as the mid-nineteenth century, numerous solutions existed to help mitigate air pollution: 
businesses knew that good stoking was the key to both using coal efficiently and reducing smoke 
emissions (Thorsheim 2006 p.18); Continental and Scandinavian homes had used far more efficient 
stoves for heating at least since the eighteenth century (Fouquet 2008 p.79); gas cookers began being 
used in the 1840s, and there was extensive gas supplies in all towns across the country (Goodall 1999 
pp.24-9); there were other smokeless fuels, such as anthracite coal (available in the South West of 
Wales) and coke (produced by carbonising the coal first), that could have been used by households for 
heating purposes (Jevons 1865 p.156); and, railroads could have expanded the limits of the city, 
spreading  the  air  pollution  and  reducing  concentration  (Jackson  2003).  So,  opportunities  for 
mitigation existed. The question was whether there was the political will to reduce emissions.  
3.3. Legislation against Industrial Pollution 
The economic imperative meant that it was hard to deny firms the right to produce. A common 
approach to the pollution problem in the nineteenth century was containment. Rather than banning 
activities,  they  were  tolerated  where  they  already  existed.  This  meant  that  polluting  industries 
concentrated in particular areas, generally working-class areas, and ensured that middle-class suburbs 
and countryside were unharmed by industry‟s expansion.  
From the 1840s, a more interventionist approach began. For instance, the Police Act introduced in 
Manchester led to the fining of thirteen cotton mills in 1845. However, they were only fined £2 each 
(Mosley 2001 p.144). Needless to say, such „powerful‟ incentives failed to alter the behaviour of 
industry and it continued to pollute where it could. This example reflects the concern that imposing 
heavy fines would harm industry, reducing employment and competitiveness (both at a local and 
national level). This was the beginning of a very long process of balancing the need to discourage 
polluting and the need to avoid imposing excessive costs on economic activities. 
In 1843, after extensive political struggle, a Parliamentary Select Committee on Smoke Prevention 
was formed. It was an acknowledgement of the national government´s responsibility to address the 
problem.  It  was  also  one  of  the  first  uses  of  scientific  expertise  to  inform  government  on  the 
appropriate action. The problem was taken sufficiently seriously to draw upon Sir Thomas Henry De 
La Beche, Director of Geological Society, and Professor Lyon Playfair of the Royal Manchester 
Institute, and calling upon eminent scientists, such as Michael Faraday (Whiteread 2011).  
The Smoke Nuisance Abatement Act of 1853 introduced legislation to fine factories that emitted 
excessive smoke in London. During the first few years, the police was actively and aggressively 
involved in enforcing the law – with hundreds of cases. However, enforcement was inconsistent and 
the fines were very low – generally, less than one pound. Furthermore, with time, enforcement waned, 
and by the 1870s, the law was ignored (Thorsheim 2006 p.112-3). More generally, many towns and 14 
 
cities across Britain were reluctant to take much action as many officials believed that punishing 
industry would drive manufacturers to less stringent locations (Thorsheim 2006 p.119).  
In 1863, the Alkali Act, seen as the first national environmental legislation, was introduced. It was 
also innovative because manufacturers´ activities, in particular, the chemical industry, were monitored 
by  the  authorities    in  order  to  minimise  the  damage  done  by  hydrogen  chloride  to  landowners, 
particularly large and wealthy ones. “A conjunction of circumstances favoured its passage[:] ... a 
practicable technology was available, most manufacturers were amenable to some control, and an 
effective lobby existed to push for legislation” (Dingle 1982 p.546). In this Act, a specific industry 
was addressed, and a condensation process was available, relatively cheaply, to capture almost all 
emissions. Using new scientific equipment developed for the purpose, it was possible to monitor 
effectively individual polluters and force them to reduce emissions (Dingle 1982). Thus, it was the 
first great success in environmental legislation. 
However, it failed to include emissions from coal combustion, despite strong efforts by prominent 
scientists Thorsheim 2006 p.113). Finally, the Sanitary Act of 1866 required (rather than allowed) 
municipal officials to prosecute owners of smoky businesses. Industrialists considered that legislation 
restricting emissions would impose unacceptable costs, and fought to defeat such parliamentary bills 
and to minimise the effectiveness when successful. Loopholes (related to wording of the act) and 
exemptions implied it was not enforced. The Public Health Act of 1875 (which did not apply to 
London) stated that smoke nuisances should be reduced “as far as practicable”, and leniency was 
common. The Public Health (London) Act of 1891 introduced equally weak and lenient legislation to 
the capital, only addressing certain businesses (Thorsheim 2006 pp.113-5). Another example of the 
power of wording in legislation was the introduction of the term “black” smoke into legislation: it 
meant that only “black” smoke could be prosecuted against. It took until 1926 for legislation to 
address non-black smoke, but, even then, each case needed to receive approval from the Ministry of 
Health.  Thus,  into  the  1950s,  legislation  on  industrial  pollution  continued  to  be  heavily  flawed 
(Thorsheim 2006 pp.131). 
Furthermore, officials and magistrates in local authorities, who were responsible for prosecution, were 
reluctant to enforce legislation. The London County Council, which was more interested in reducing 
emissions  but  with  no  immediate  power,  noted  over  9,000  failures  to  prosecute  air  pollution 
infringements between 1892 and 1904. A survey of local health boards across Britain in 1886 gives 
clues to the problem, as it indicates that nearly one-fifth of the members on the boards were in 
manufacturing  (Thorsheim  2006  pp.115-8).  Thus,  those  that  were  likely  to  suffer  most  from 
environmental  legislation  found  ways  to  influence  politicians  that  were  drafting  legislation  and 
making decisions about it, and to be in positions to minimise their enforcement.  
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3.4. Adaptation as a Solution to Environmental Problems  
As mentioned above, by the mid-nineteenth century, there were a number of solutions to reducing 
pollution emissions or concentrations. The main solutions were for consumption to become more 
efficient, switching to less polluting energy sources or exporting the pollution. Smoke abatement 
societies had put pressure on government, and legislation had been introduced. Unfortunately, it was 
relatively weak and poorly enforced, especially in the long run.  
Nonetheless, in the 1890s, the air pollution problem in London (and in other cities) was partially 
resolved. While still high by twenty-first century standards, air pollution concentration halved over 
the next fifty years, dropping below 300μg/m3 (see Figure 2). Fouquet (2011b) argued that the main 
explanation  was  not  fuel  switching,  as  coal  consumption  and  emissions  in  London  continued  to 
increase  between  1890  and  1910.  It  was  probably  not  energy  efficiency  improvements  either. 
Although the efficiency of many technologies did improve substantially during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, income and price elasticities appear to have been very high (Fouquet and Pearson 
2012). In other words, efficiency improvements most probably led to large rebound effects, ultimately 
increasing coal consumption, as Jevons (1865) had predicted. 
Instead, the main explanation was the suburbanisation of British cities with the advent of commuter 
railways. The urbanised area of London increased five-fold between 1841 and 1901, halving the 
population density, which then declined a further three-fold between 1901 and 1951 (Demographia 
2011). This enabled the population to live less densely and dilute the pollution concentration. 
This could be seen as a form of adaptation to the environmental problem, which led inadvertently to 
improvements in conditions. But, it was an adaptation to a broader series of social and environmental 
problems, rather than just to air pollution. During the second-half of the nineteenth century, upper-
middle class families sought to live away from the crime, sewage and smoke that engulfed Victorian 
cities (Luckin 2000). Over the decades, they moved away. The introduction of the Cheap Trains Act 
of 1883 and a rapid expansion of suburban housing in the 1890s allowed a larger proportion of the 
population with more modest means to live in the suburbs and commute into the city, leaving the 
poorest in the centres (Thompson 1982, Jackson 2003, Burnett 1986).  
Effectively, the demand for urban improvements increased during the second-half of the nineteenth 
century, and transport and housing markets reacted, although slowly, to the demand. It took them 
around fifty years to adapt to the demand for improvements in social and environmental quality, and 
the market outcome was to export pollution (to the suburbs), rather than reduce it. This was not 
necessarily a desirable long term solution – as was discovered at the end of the twentieth century, 
when it continued to be a problem in the form of acid rain and climate change. 16 
 
3.5. Demand for Low Polluting Energy Sources before 1950 
As suggested, energy markets were even less effective at responding to the demand for environmental 
improvements. With weak legislation, businesses and households had little incentive to reduce their 
smoke emissions. Although socially desirable, the free-rider problem hindered the evolution of the 
market for low polluting energy sources, thus, forcing individuals to “adapt”.  
Despite the market failure and the more minor role in improving pollution concentrations, it is worth 
examining the extent of the demand to switch to less polluting fuels. That is, some consumers may 
still have been willingness to pay for low polluting energy sources.  
If consumers sought cleaner fuels, they had the option of using anthracite coal, coke, gas and later 
electricity. Anthracite coal was of particular value for households as it was clean to handle, producing 
no dust or smoke. “It burns very slowly and never requires poking or attention, except to replenish the 
stove” (Jevons 1915 p.660). Welsh (steam and anthracite) coal was roughly 20% more expensive than 
standard  coal  (Clay  and  Troesken  2010  p.48).  Nevertheless,  the  doubling  of  anthracite  coal 
consumption in Britain between 1894 and 1913 - total coal consumption increased 45% (Jevons 1915 
p.665) – may have been influenced by the rising demand for smokeless fuels. 
Interestingly, British behaviour was still not in-line with other countries. On the continent, the use of 
stoves had encouraged the consumption of anthracite. For example, it was sold in Paris at £3 per ton – 
equivalent to £(2000)300 per tonne (Jevons 1915 p.666) – three times the average price of standard 
coal in Britain. In 1915, more than half of the United Kingdom´s production of anthracite was for 
export, where as it was around one-third for other forms of coal.  
An alternative to anthracite was coke, often the by-product of creating gas from coal, but also a 
crucial fuel in certain manufacturing processes, such as in iron smelting. Coke was also smokeless at 
use.  However,  by  consuming  coke  (or  gas)  much  of  the  problem  was  shifted  to  the  source  of 
production. Nearby residents “complained that its fumes harmed plants and trees, sullied clothing, 
tarnished brass and copper, discolour paint, and impaired health… Over time, such localities became 
occupied  almost  exclusively  by  poor  and  working-class  people  who  rarely  possessed  sufficient 
economic, political or legal power to challenge polluters´ activities” (Thorsheim 2002 p.386).  
Coke production nearly tripled between 1890 and 1910 (Church 1986). It is hard to attribute the 
source of demand. But, since the iron and steel industries energy consumption only increased by 15% 
in that period, it is probable that a great deal of households began to use coke for heating and cooking 
purposes  at  the  turn  of  the  century.  Thus,  it  might  have  helped  alleviate  the  pollution  problem. 
However, the nature of coke and gas production implied that neighbourhoods near the production site 
suffered even more pollution (Thorsheim 2002).    17 
 
Driven by the gas companies‟ initiatives to find new markets following competition from electricity in 
the lighting market, there was a rapid uptake of gas cookers from the 1890s. The Gas Light & Coke 
Company,  which  supplied  two-thirds  of  London  customers,  noted  that  in  1892  only  2%  of  its 
customers had gas cookers and, by 1911, 69% had them (Goodall 1999 p.105). In other words, nearly 
500,000  households  in  London  (or  more  than  half  the  homes  in  London)  had  gas  cookers.  An 
impressive, if slightly more modest growth was seen across the country - in Britain, by 1898, 20% of 
gas customers, equivalent to 6% of households in the country. This increased to 42% of British gas 
customers (or roughly 26% of all households) in 1914 (Goodall 1999 p.106). The popularity of gas 
cookers continued to grow. By 1940, 3.5 million gas cookers had been sold (Goodall 1999 p.107).  
Interestingly, by 1905, 22% of municipal customers had gas cookers, while 42% of private customers 
had  cookers.  Over  the  next  ten  years,  private  companies  increased  the  gap  –  in  1914,  35%  of 
municipal prepayment customers had gas cookers, while 57% of private prepayment customers had 
cookers (Goodall 1999 p.106). This institutional difference continued for decades: in the 1920s and 
1930s,  annual  gas  cooker  sales  were consistently  one-third  greater  amongst  private customers  as 
municipal customers (Goodall 1999 p.107). Thus, these gaps show the clear failure of government to 
promote low polluting energy sources at a time when it was desperately needed, and that private 
enterprise was more effective at promoting a transition.  
While gas cookers were competitive and cleaner, and reflected a more modern lifestyle, gas heating 
was still three times more expensive than anthracite coal (Jevons 1915 p.666). Much of the coal 
household demand, especially on cold days when the heavy fogs occurred, was not for cooking but for 
heating.  Indeed,  total  coal  consumption  (excluding  the  coal  used  for  gas  works)  in  London  still 
increased by 12% from 1890 to 1910 (see, for instance, Clay and Troesken 2010 p.71) - implying that 
total emissions rose, as well. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the increase in consumption of 
low  polluting  energy  sources  may  have  helped avoid  a  worse  “business-as-usual”  counterfactual. 
After all, between 1890 and 1910, national population increased 19%, per capita GDP 13%, and coal 
prices stayed relatively constant (Fouquet 2008). Thus, given the probable high income and price 
elasticities at the turn of century (Fouquet and Pearson 2012), coal consumption and emissions might 
have been expected to increase substantially more than 12%.  
Later, in the 1930s, electric cookers was seen as the height of modernity and their use took-off, 
increasing from 210,000 in 1932 to 1.5 million in 1938 (Bowden 1988 p.44). Part of this increase was 
driven by accessibility to electricity. In 1932, only 31% of the housing stock had access to electricity; 
by 1938, 65% were wired (Bowden 1988 p.44). Nevertheless, the proportion of wired-homes using 
electric cookers rose from 5% to 17% (or 1.5% of all homes to 11%) in that time. Also, rising 
incomes helped boost demand, as electric cookers were seen as the more advanced than gas cookers - 
given that only wealthier households were able to afford to use electric cookers, they were probably 18 
 
substituting away from gas (rather coal and its derivatives). During the 1930s, electricity prices fell 
35%, while gas prices increased (Fouquet 2011a). Thus, this new demand for a low polluting energy 
source was driven probably more by economic forces, convenience and status, than responding to a 
demand for environmental quality.    
3.6. The Evolution of Government on Environmental Legislation 
Historically,  the  British  government  had  tended  to  avoid  involvement  in  industrial  activity  or 
meddling in domestic affairs. The latter would have represented an invasion of personal liberties, and 
the former was appropriate only when absolutely necessary. The dominant economic ideology within 
government  before  the  twentieth  century  was  relatively  laissez  faire  within Britain, apart for the 
growth of fiscal intervention to support the public budget and debt. This ideology, in part, reflected 
those in power, landed gentry and increasingly entrepreneurs and merchants, who benefitted most 
from  the  lack  of  government  involvement  in  economic  affairs. Thus,  one  of  the  main  perceived 
functions of government was to protect private property, but not to interfere in its use (Thorsheim 
2006 p.110).  
However, the role of government began to increase from the 1830s, as it was seen that if property was 
damaged without consent by others´ behaviour, there might be grounds for government intervention. 
Traditionally, victims of pollution had the right to seek compensation for the damage caused by the 
perpetrator,  either  in  Coasian  negotiations  or  through  the  courts.  However,  the  expansion  and 
increasing concentration of industrial activities made it difficult to undertake such costly negotiations 
and  prosecution.  “Early  environmental  legislation  was  …  justified  by  the  argument  that  state 
intervention was necessary in cases where it was impractical for individuals to identify and hold 
responsible the particular firms that were causing harm to property”, such as the Alkali Act of 1863 
(Thorsheim 2006 p.111). 
Another important change in the role of government followed the First World War. The government´s 
strategic interests led it to become heavily involved in many aspects of economic and social affairs 
that were previously seen as beyond its remit. It also started to develop a more analytical approach to 
problems. This included its role in directing energy policy to reduce air pollution (Thorsheim 2006 
p.129). 
With this changing role and greater analysis of government came an increased need for expert advice. 
Before  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  science  had  often  been seen  as unimportant,  and  not  directly 
relevant to public affairs. It started to be used to advise in public health issues, such as their use for 
evidence  by  the  Select  Committee  on  Smoke  Prevention  in  1843.  Nevertheless,  their  active 
involvement in directing policy was much slower, and only became more common in the twentieth 
century  (Thorsheim  2006  p.129-30).  Without  these  major  changes  in  political  involvement  and 19 
 
understanding of problems, it is unlikely that government would have acted as a conduit between the 
demand for environmental quality and the supply.  
3.7. The Big Smog and High Polluting Energy Sources 
Conditions by the mid-twentieth century were much improved, compared with fifty years earlier. 
Average air pollution concentration had fallen below 200μg/m3 (see Figure 3). Foggy days were 
occasional and shocking, rather than part of everyday life. Severe air pollution was less acceptable 
then, than it had been in the nineteenth century. One could argue that, perhaps as a result of rising 
income  or  greater  awareness  of  the  health  impacts,  the  demand  for  environmental  quality  had 
increased considerably by the mid-twentieth century.  
Starting on 5th December 1952, cold and windless weather patterns trapped smoke over London for 
almost one week. The cold weather increased the number of domestic fires; the resulting smoke 
stopped sunlight from providing natural heating, thus, requiring more coal to be burnt. The intense fog 
led to many respiratory problems, especially amongst the young, the weak and the aged.  
The Big Smog shocked the nation. The ministry of health downplayed the event, blaming influenza 
and already weak victims – it initially suggested that 2,851 people died from the fog. Its attitude was 
to feel that the fogs had been happening for centuries and it had little role to play. In the months 
following the event, the government was severely criticised for its indifference, despite some warning 
that this could happen again. Seven months later, the Beaver Committee was formed to investigate the 
event - the official number of deaths was eventually placed at 3,000-4,000 (Thorsheim 2006 p.163-6). 
However, one recent study of the event estimated that the air pollution may have led to an additional 
12,000 deaths - including long term effects, yet excluding those associated with influenza and the cold 
(Bell et al 2004). 
One potential aggravating factor was the type of coal used. In the winters of 1946-7 and 1950-1, the 
coal industry, run as a monopoly by the National Coal Board, faced major crises. Unable to supply 
enough coal for the demand, it began to ration. In 1951, trying to prioritise needs for electricity 
supply, it limited industrial consumption to 85% of normal use, it demanded that 3,000 passenger 
railway services be cancelled, and it rationed most households to 8cwt (roughly 400kg), although in 
Southern England, they were limited to 6cwt (about 300kg) of coal for the months of January and 
February (Jackson 1974 p.73). 
The National Coal Board had been criticised for not supplying enough fuel to heat homes. It planned 
to keep rationing until 1958. However, prior to the season of cold weather, it organized an intensive 
advertisement campaign to encourage the use of “nutty slack” coal for domestic heating and, on the 
1st December 1952, it would stop rationing its use. Nutty slack was a mix of small lumps of coal and 20 
 
dust. It was dirty to handle, produced a lot more smoke, but it was cheaper. It was 20 shilling per ton 
(i.e., 30%) cheaper than standard coal (Thorsheim 2006 p.161-2). Although it is difficult to find 
estimates  of  household  consumption,  in  five  years,  between  1948  and  1953, the  consumption  of 
“slack” coal increased 25% and increased its share of total UK coal consumption from 34% to 39% 
(Ministry of Power 1961 p.72).  
To minimise or avoid future similar episodes, the Beaver Committee highlighted the need to warn the 
public,  advise  vulnerable populations  and  maintain  the  use  of  smokeless  fuels.  The  final  Beaver 
Committee report in late 1954 proposed the creation of a Clean Air Act which included domestic, as 
well as industrial, pollution (Brimblecombe 2006).  
3.8. The Clean Air Act and the Shift to Low Polluting Energy Sources 
The Clean Air Act specified “black” areas, where the problem was most acute and smoke control 
programmes were most important. All areas in Greater London were designated as “black” areas and, 
generally, required controls. In the North West of England, 95 of the 151 areas were either “black” 
and/or to be controlled (Scarrow 1972 p.264).   
In controlled areas, smoke emitting fuels, principally coal, was banned and smokeless fuels needed to 
be  used  for  heating  instead.  Until  then,  the  main  cause  of  local  air  pollution,  households,  had 
remained an uncomfortable issue. The Clean Air Act required the conversion of domestic fires where 
pollution  was  a  problem.  It  also  involved  inspection  beforehand  to  identify  the  extent  of  the 
conversion needed and then afterwards to ensure the conversion was done properly.  
A number of factors influenced a borough´s progress towards meeting the requirements of the Clean 
Air Act of 1956. These were a borough´s wealth, a perceived need for improvement in air quality and 
mining areas. First, the conversions and the inspections were very costly for local authorities. Wealthy 
“black” areas consistently made better progress towards meeting the targets for compliance with the 
Clean Air Act than poorer areas (Scarrow 1972 p.267). Second, the nine boroughs with the highest 
rates  of  bronchitis  mortality  in  Britain  had  a  median  progress  (towards  compliance  with  the 
legislation) of 46.3%, while the boroughs with the lowest rates had a progress of 19.4% (Scarrow 
1972 p.277). Finally, mining areas tended to be reluctant to introduce changes as this was a politically 
sensitive issue.  
It is valuable to consider the environmental and health impact of the Clean Air Act. From 1958 to 
1965, smoke concentrations improved greatly – in London sites, a 60% reduction, and in other sites, 
27.5% (Scarrow 1972 p.272). Crucially, by the mid-1960s, weekly mortality and illness rates stopped 
varying with air pollution concentration, as they had before 1960 (Scarrow 1972 p.273). Another of 
the noticeable effects of better air quality was greater sunshine. During the months of November, 21 
 
December and January in the 1960s, inner city London had 55% more sunshine than in the same 
months  between  1930  and  1960.  Interestingly,  this  would  probably  have  helped  reduced  energy 
consumption associated with space heating and lighting (Scarrow 1972 p.273).   
However, the improvements that were observed in the early 1960s may have been the acceleration of 
a larger trend. Air pollution concentrations had been falling since 1900 (see Figure 3). Similarly, 
energy consumption patterns in the second half of the twentieth century were also changing. “The 
new affluence … in postwar Britain … resulted in a demand for higher heating standards, viz., the 
cleaner systems which solid smokeless fuels introduced, and the labor-free, automatic, multiroom, and 
total-building heating systems associated with electricity, gas, and oil.” (Scarrow 1972 p.275). A 
survey  of  households  in  1961  found  that  space  and  higher  standards  of  heating  were  the  most 
important features to improve in homes (Scarrow 1972 p.275).  
In addition to rising income and changing consumer preferences, energy supply companies played an 
important role in first delaying and then accelerating the transition. After the Clean Air Act was 
passed, the National Coal Board introduced an advertisement campaign promoting the “cosy coal 
fire” to discourage a shift to oil, gas or electricity. Local coal merchants also tried to oppose and delay 
local authority efforts to comply with the Clean Air Act (Scarrow 1972 p.277).  
However, gas manufacturers seeking the cheapest production fuel heavily affected the market for 
smokeless fuels. Traditionally, they had used coal to produce gas. As a by-product, they also produced 
coke, which could be sold as a smokeless fuel. However, in the late 1950s, they found that oil was 
cheaper to produce gas. This switch implied that there was a shortage of coke, officially announced in 
1963. The National Coal Board failed to produce enough coke and other smokeless fuels to meet the 
demand, encouraging a switch to other non-solid fuels (Scarrow 1972 p.277). 
Another  important  factor  was  the  slum  clearance  programmes  introduced  from  the  mid-1950s. 
Between 1955 and 1970, 733,000 houses were demolished in London and other Northern “black” 
areas - equivalent to one-sixth of the homes in the highly polluted areas in 1970 (Scarrow 1972 
p.276). These homes were replaced with central-heating system that rarely depended on coal.  
Smokeless solid fuels enabled households and other building to comply with the legislation while 
keeping  the  conventional  way  of  heating  a  building.  Indeed,  in  1950,  before  legislation  was 
introduced, nearly 40% of the heating demand in London was met by other solid fuels, which were 
mostly smokeless. In other words, many consumers had already been willing to pay for the smokeless 
fuels before the Big Smog and the Clean Air Act. It is difficult to identify the premium they paid for 
smokeless fuels, but it was no doubt more expensive than standard coal. Yet, after the Clean Act, the 
share of coal and other solid fuels in London declined from 71% in 1950 to 24% in 1970 (see Table 
1). 22 
 
Table 1. Non-Electric Energy Use for Heating in London, 1950-2000  
  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Oil  10.7%  26.7%  46.9%  27.6%  14.3%  4.8% 
Gas  17.9%  16.7%  26.6%  65.5%  85.7%  95.2% 
Coal  32.1%  16.7%  3.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Other solid fuels  39.3%  36.7%  21.9%  6.9%  0.0%  0.0% 
Source: GLA (2002) p.21. 
Note: Electricity is not included because of the difficulty of separating consumption between heating and other 
services – its inclusion would only increase the decline in solid fuels.  
In the 1960s, the biggest substitution was to oil – meeting nearly half of the heating consumption in 
London. However, the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea and the Oil Shocks led consumers to 
switch to gas – from 26% in 1970 to 65% in 1980 and up to 85% in 1990 (Fouquet 2008).  
3.9. The Dash for Gas 
The tendency to export pollution, either by suburbanising British cities or creating smoke-less zones 
and higher industrial chimneys, meant that emissions were not always discouraged. Nevertheless, 
from the mid-twentieth century, as the British economy moved away from heavy industries and made 
the transition from coal towards petroleum (see Figure 2), emissions did decline. 
 Nevertheless,  coal  consumption  was  crucial  for  power  generation  and  was  still  responsible  for 
sulphur  dioxide  emissions  that  were  associated  with  acid  rain.  Due  to  prevailing  winds,  acid 
deposition occurred in the Highlands and Scandinavia, increasing acidity in lakes and forests, killing 
certain plants and animals, and corrosion of buildings.  
In the 1980s, much of the pressure to set target reductions in emissions came from other countries. 
This included the Scandinavians (who were concerned about British acid rain harming their lakes and 
forests) and the West Germans (who had introduced Flue Gas Desulphurisation units on their coal-
burning  power  stations  to  reduce  emissions,  raising  the  price  of  generating  electricity  and,  thus, 
reducing the competitiveness of their products). This international pressure led to the creation of an 
international convention. The Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) was 
proposed in Geneva in 1979; the United Kingdom signed in 1982. This set an international framework 
for agreeing to reduction protocols. In 1985, the first protocol proposed was to reduce sulphur dioxide 
by 30% of the 1980 level by 1993. The British government did not sign (Fouquet 1993).  
Within the European Community, pressure was mounting for the British to accept targets. After many 
rounds  of  negotiation  to  introduce  the  Large  Combustion  Plant  Directive,  in  1988,  the  United 
Kingdom agreed to reduce its electricity generation and large industrial SO2 emissions by 20% of the 23 
 
1980 level by 1993 and by 60% of the 1980 level by 2003.This change of stance by the British 
coincided with plans to privatise the electricity supply industry, thus, the costs of reducing future 
emissions would not be incurred by the public sector (Fouquet 1993).  
Indeed, a shift away from coal was achieved – from 75% of the total inputs in 1981 to 65% of the 
total in 1991 to 28% of the total in 2000. Between 1981 and 1991, nuclear power rose from 15% to 
23% of the total and, between 1991 and 2000, natural gas increased from less than 1% of the total to 
38% (Fouquet 2008). This shift has been mainly due to successive United Kingdom government‟s 
support  for  nuclear  power  until  the  mid  1990s  and  to  the  privatisation  and  liberalisation  of  the 
electricity supply industry which encouraged generators to use CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine) 
plants, because of lower costs of installation and because of the incumbent‟s desire to create over-
capacity discouraging market entry (Newbery 1994). 
 
4. Insights for Meeting the Demand for Climate Stability 
Throughout history, citizens have been harmed by air pollution resulting from fuel combustion. The 
episodes discussed in this paper led to growing calls for improvements in air quality. They tended to 
coincide  with  periods  of economic  growth.  This implies,  first,  that  the  damage  increased  due  to 
greater consumption and pollution (i.e., a leftward shift in the supply curve in Figure 1), possibly with 
rising marginal external costs or benefits of abatement (i.e., a downward sloping demand curve). 
Second, peace and affluence enabled its citizens to be concerned with more than their basic economic 
needs (i.e., a rightward shift in the demand curve). Whether John Evelyn in the seventeenth century, 
the Smoke Abatement Societies in the nineteenth century or an outraged public in the mid-twentieth 
century, demand has put pressure on governments to introduce legislation. Despite it being a general 
period of low air pollution by historical (though not today´s) standards, the episode with the strongest 
demand for improvements (see Table 2) was after the Big Smog of 1952 when the death toll in 
London was particularly shocking and scientists could attribute these deaths to poor air quality.   
It has been proposed that the basis for climate policy lies in a domestic demand for climate policy 
rather than in a multilateral agreement or a supranational command (Tol 2012). There is evidence that 
some  people  in  certain  countries  value  climate  stabilisation  and  are  willing  to  pay  to  reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (Li et al. 2004, Cameron 2005, Berrens et al. 2006, Lee and Cameron 2008, 
Brouwer et al 2008, Mackerron et al 2009, Cai et al. 2010, Löschel 2010, Diedrich and Goeschl 
2011). However, there is little evidence of strong support for major and costly abatement on the scale 
that occurred in the 1950s.  24 
 
Table 2. Summary of Historical Demand, Legislation and Substitution to Low Polluting Energy 
Sources 
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Despite this growing literature on the relationships between the demand for climate stability and key 
variables, such as cultural factors, income, or potential damages, the exact causal mechanisms are not 
clearly understood. The evidence in this paper suggests that, while rising income does appear to be 
associated with greater concern, demand is likely to be greatest in periods of economic prosperity, 
rather  than  in  the  depths  of  a  recession.  In  addition,  concurring  with  Lee  and  Cameron  (2008), 
demand grows as the perceived damages rise. Also, based on these historical experiences, the demand 
for climate stability will probably increase as a result of extreme and shocking events that (most will 
agree) can be attributed (with a high degree of confidence) to climate change.  
However, even with a major demand for improvements, it is far from certain legislation will be 
introduced.  The  smoke  abatement  movement  in  the  Victorian  era  faced  a  clear  example  of 
government failure because of politicians‟ belief that legislation would harm business and industry. 
This failure was driven by counter-lobbying to avoid or delay legislation, weaken its effectiveness 
through the wording of documents, and discourage enforcement. Clearly, pressure groups for and 
against climate action are seeking to sway the public and, particularly, politicians (Boyer and Laffont 
1999). The strongest argument against abatement is still the fear of the economic costs of abatement, 
either  direct  or  associated  with  an  economy´s  competitiveness.  Thus,  overcoming  the  perceived 
economic damage from legislations is still the most likely way to sway politicians (Shogren 1998).    25 
 
Furthermore, just like in Victorian Britain, although legislation is being introduced, it is failing to 
address household behaviour, and their emissions associated with residential and transport energy 
consumption. In democracies, the politician´s fear of angering voters weakens the effectiveness of 
most  climate  policies.  It  also  implies  that  the  public´s  demand  for  climate  stability  is  especially 
fragile.   
So, even with effective legislation introduced, for it to be sustained (i.e., enforced and not revoked by 
future governments), it must be of limited cost to polluters, and pro-legislation pressure groups must 
continue to maintain their pressures on politicians. For demand to be sustained, it will either require a 
series of shocking events, or a wide scale change in value systems that can support and in lifestyles 
that can accommodate long term political pressure. Indeed, the opposite is more likely – those that are 
suffering from the legislation are willing to pay for the legislation to not be enforced or to be rejected 
by  successive  governments.  Also,  the  lags  involved  in  environmental  “markets”  means  that  if 
government introduces legislation, those seeking improvements may have to wait a decade or more to 
assess the success of these policies.     
Although  not  directly  about  energy-related  air  pollution,  the  Alkali  Act  of  1863  shows  that 
environmental legislation can be effective if the victims are sufficiently influential, the polluters are 
clearly defined and observable group, relatively cheap solutions are available and equipment exists for 
monitoring  pollution  levels.  Under  such  circumstances,  manufacturers  can  be  open  to  reducing 
emissions and government willing to introduce legislation. This also suggests that legislation targeted 
at specific groups may be more effective and sustainable than when covering a heterogeneous array of 
polluters.  
Another lesson is how the demand for environmental improvements is being met. In a number of 
instances, the reaction was first containment of the problem, then dispersion of (or exporting) the 
problem.  Although  countries  are  exporting  their  carbon  dioxide  emissions,  such  as  through  the 
importing of goods, this is even less of a solution for a global pollutant. Similarly, but without a clear 
historical precedent, carbon sequestration, in its various guises, offers another approach to dealing 
with emissions without actually reducing them. This approach is, therefore, potentially attractive to 
many consumers as it does not affect lifestyles, work or the market for energy greatly; although, at 
present, the costs of carbon capture are expensive.  
A further solution was and is to promote energy efficiency improvements. Markets have an incentive 
to seek efficiency improvements in order to provide energy services at lower prices, and have been 
especially successful over the last two hundred years (Fouquet 2011a). Thus, governments can aid 
markets  to  work  towards  further  energy  efficiency  improvements.  Unfortunately,  especially  in 
developing countries, rebound effects may eat-up some of the savings and, in the longer run, rising 26 
 
income levels are likely to lead to more demand for energy services and energy (Fouquet and Pearson 
2012). So, efficiency measures cannot solve the problem on their own.      
Transitions  to  low  polluting  energy  sources  have  been  and  are  clear  solutions  to  specific 
environmental  problems.  Independently  of  governments,  markets  can  seek  the  energy  transition 
option. History tells us that a niche non-free-riding demand can exist for low carbon energy sources 
and  technologies.  This  demand  will  be  greater  if  the  sources  and  technologies  have  desirable 
characteristics  that  fossil  fuels  and  their  related  equipment  do  not  have.  One  powerful  driver  of 
demand in the past, as seen in the demands for gas and electric cookers, has been social status. Thus, 
if  low  carbon  sources  and  technologies  can  be  seen  as  status-enhancing,  they  may  achieve  an 
important niche demand. If this niche demand develops, and producers can achieve economies of 
scale, then the prices can become competitive with fossil fuels. In this case, markets can drive the 
transition to a low carbon economy.   
More  probably,  though,  government  will  need  to  create  the  demand  for  these  energy  sources. 
Transitions often require the discovery of new solutions for many different sectors and services, the 
transformation  of  energy  systems  (which  are  complex),  and  the  decline  of energy  industries  and 
technologies that are represented by powerful pressure groups (Fouquet 2010). Thus, given the scale 
of the change and the time they take to unfold, governments tend to be reluctant to push for energy 
transitions  in  the first instance. Furthermore, transitions have and  may create new environmental 
problems (such as coke and town gas, petroleum products, nuclear power or even certain renewable 
energy sources). Nevertheless, the experience of the Clean Air Act of 1956 shows that, with sufficient 
pressure and resolve, governments can initiate transitions to low polluting energy sources. 
Inevitably, the direction taken to meet the demand for environmental improvement reflects a tension 
between political and economic forces, and not always the most socially beneficial course of action 
that is followed. The direction chosen to achieve climate stability will reflect the costs of abatement 
associated with low energy sources and technologies, efficiency improvements, carbon sequestration 
and geo-engineering, and the influence of the pressure groups representing the various options.  
Ultimately,  the  broader  lessons  are  more  subtle  than  the  standard  textbook  view  proposing  that 
markets fail and governments have to intervene, or even that both tend to fail. These experiences 
suggest  that  both  markets  and  government  can  eventually  play  a  role  in  meeting  environmental 
concerns. First, governments tend not to prioritise environmental legislation. They only introduce 
effective,  enforced  and  sustained  legislation  when  the  conditions  are  ideal  or  the  pressure  is 
unavoidable. The Alkali Act of 1863 and the Clean Air Act of 1956 show that broader legislation can 
be effective – but, like in the latter case, it may come one hundred years later than was probably 
socially optimal (Fouquet 2011b).  27 
 
Second, viewed over a century or more, markets can also adapt to environmental demands (such as 
the shift to suburbia at the end of the nineteenth century, the demand for gas and electric cookers in 
the early twentieth century, and the dash for gas). However, apart for the latter case, they tend to do so 
very slowly and not necessarily in a socially optimal way – after all, they seek the cheapest or most 
profitable  solution.  Thus,  it  would  seem  unwise  to  wait  for  markets  on  their  own  to  solve 
environmental problems. It might take centuries and luck, and not be a satisfactory outcome. 
Finally, crucial to the outcome of the episodes reviewed was the evolution of ideology, of government 
attitudes towards intervention and of the relationship between the market and the state. It would be 
difficult to identify trends in the forces over the next century. Nevertheless, they will evolve, such as 
perhaps new beliefs about our relationship with nature or the potential globalisation of markets and 
governments, and will play an important role in determining any transition to a low carbon economy.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to understand the long run demand for energy-related environmental 
quality, its influence on legislation and on the substitution to low polluting energy sources. Although 
it did not focus exclusively on energy transitions, it sought to present some of the forces that drive a 
transition to low polluting energy sources.  
It started by presenting a simple framework of the relationship between the demand for and supply of 
environmental quality, environmental legislation and energy. It started with the standard argument 
that  the  market  for  environmental  quality  fails,  thus,  generating  a  demand  for  environmental 
regulation. It outlined the steps required to supply effective, enforced and sustained environmental 
legislation, which can seek to influence the supply of environmental quality by a number of ways, 
including exporting pollution, encouraging pollution abatement or energy efficient technology, or 
switching to low polluting energy sources and technologies. It identified numerous factors that can 
lead  government  to  fail  to  meet  this  demand.  Rather  than  claiming  to  be  a  powerful  model  of 
behaviour, this framework simply offers one way of investigating the long run processes that lead 
from an environmental concern to a potential change in environmental quality.  
Previously, this framework has been briefly used to discuss the rapid decline and improvements in air 
quality  experienced  during  the  Victorian  era  (Fouquet  2011b).  Here,  it  formed  the  structure  for 
presenting a series of episodes in British history where a demand for improvements in energy-related 
environmental  quality  existed.  This  review  of  historical  environmental  demand  focussed  on  five 
episodes:  the  seventeenth  century,  the  Victorian  era,  and  the  early-,  mid  and  late-1900s.  Each 
experience  was  quite  distinct  and  offered  insights  about  the  validity  of  this  framework,  its 28 
 
weaknesses, and about details that it cannot incorporate.  It was proposed that these insights were 
useful for understanding the long run process and barriers to meeting demands for climate stability, 
possibly through a transition to low carbon energy sources. 
Gathering and using evidence is fraught with difficulty, especially as the processes under observation 
can unfold over different time periods – demand can form in days; legislation can take months to 
introduce; but, markets can take years, decades or even centuries to change. In addition, historical data 
is inevitably inconsistent and frequently inaccurate.  
Furthermore,  to  present  these  episodes  within  the  proposed  framework,  it  may  have  failed  to 
emphasise or even identify certain important determinants of the process. In particular, a combination 
of factors and the co-evolution of a number of institutions and organisations need to occur in parallel 
and  underlie  these  changes.  Indeed,  there  were  many  economic,  social,  political  and  cultural 
transformations  that  were  happening  simultaneously  and  had  important  bearings  on  the  episodes 
discussed. Space was the limiting factor in drawing-on these important aspects of change, and should 
be integrated more fully in future work. A good complement to the current paper is Turnheim and 
Geels  (2012),  which  analyses  the  decline  of  the  coal  industry  and  its  demand  through  a  co-
evolutionary lens.  
Finally, there are considerable differences between the past and the future. One obvious difference is 
the characteristics of the demand for improvements in air pollution and for climate stability, as well as 
the related legislative issues and energy markets. For instance, the latter addresses a global stock 
pollutant,  with  the  potential  for  international  spillovers  of  ideas  and  technologies  to  address  the 
problem.  
Despite  the  limitations  of  the  present  paper, it  is  proposed  that  the  insights discussed  above  are 
valuable. It is possible that low carbon energy sources and technologies will become cheaper than 
fossil fuels, in which case markets can drive the transition to low polluting energy sources. This may 
occur first in some countries where renewable energy resources are unusually abundant and cheap. 
Alternatively,  it  might  occur  in  a  country  where  consumers  refuse  to  free-ride  and  demand  low 
polluting energy. Then again, if the markets do not drive the transition, governments will need to push 
it, and this cannot be expected without strong and sustained demand for climate stability. Yet, while 
demand  is  a  prerequisite,  it  is  not  enough.  It  must  also  be  spearheaded  by  strong,  creative  and 
sustained  pressure  groups  (i.e.,  powerful  lobbying  and  the  weakening  of  the  counter-lobby)  to 
introduce legislation, to enforce it and to avoid it being overturned by future governments.  
At present, however, it is highly doubtful whether, in any country, there exists a stable demand for 
climate  stability  large  or powerful  enough  to  drive  the  long  run  changes  necessary  to  achieve  a 
transition to a low carbon economy. Thus, the author of this paper wonders whether history might not 29 
 
repeat itself, and, through a combination of markets and governments, mostly failing, but at times 
responding to a weak demand, climate stability will eventually be achieved, at the very least, one 
hundred years later than was socially optimal.   
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